postmodern critical theory vs. evolutionary psychology

topic posted Sat, December 1, 2007 - 8:55 PM by  automatthew
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hey all,

i just wrote this paper about a conversation between a feminist critical theorist and an evolutionary psychologist and thought i would share. and i thought it might spark a discussion about the relationship between an evolutionary perspective on human behavior and cognition and the larger intellectual projects of a social science pre-occupied with subjectivity.


Matthew: Hello everyone! Welcome to our show. As you know every week we invite two scholars who hold opposing viewpoints on a particular issue to come on the show and enlighten us with their discussion. This week we have David Buss, professor of Psychology at the University of Texas at Austin, and Sandra Bartky, professor emeritus of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Professor Buss is a prominent voice in the growing field of evolutionary psychology, an approach to psychology that tries to understand behavior and cognition through the lens of evolved solutions to particular adaptive problems. Professor Bartky is a prominent voice in the field of feminist philosophy and has made great contributions to feminist thought in her critique of “femininity” through a post-structuralist approach to the problem of “feminine” embodiment. Today we will be discussing the bodily practices that women go through to shape their bodies according to standards of beauty. I’d like to start off with a general discussion of how you both think one should approach this issue. Professor Bartky, why don’t we start with you?

Bartky: Well, I think that Foucault provides us with a very effective access point to understand what’s going on here. According to Foucault, we are living in a society that has been profoundly shaped by a historical trend toward an ever-greater scrutiny and disciplining of the body. In particular, through social institutions like schools, hospitals, prisons, and factories bodies entered into this great machinery of power that dominated them, penetrated them, and coerced them into docility. What is historically novel about the period that we’re living in now is that this power has entered into our bodies, shaping not just the product of our labor or enforcing deference but how we live in and experience our bodies. What Foucault does not do is distinguish between the way that these structures of power have penetrated and shaped the bodies of men and women differently. I think that this issue of women shaping their bodies according to an unattainable physical ideal is really an example of this, the particular way that this process of bodily discipline is directed at women.

Buss: Well, obviously I disagree. In trying to understand human behavior and cognition I start from the point of view that human beings are organisms that are the way that they are because they have evolved to solve adaptive problems. Indeed, every animal, including humans, that is alive today is alive because every single one of its ancestors was successful at solving the adaptive problem of passing on their genetic material before they died, and all the host of problems that needed to be solved to get to that point. This series of successes has shaped the human organism to be successful, i.e. to solve adaptive problems. Behavior and cognition cannot be separated from this organizing principle of traits that have evolved to solve adaptive problems. Indeed, any complex characteristic of any organism must exist because it has evolved to solve an adaptive problem. That’s because the selection of traits that are adaptive is the only way that complexity can arise in organisms. The chance that something as complex as a hand or an eye could come together by random mutations is infinitesimal. The only process that exists, or at least that we are aware of, that is capable of organizing a complex set of traits into something that performs a function is the natural selection of adaptive traits. And the mind is certainly both surpassingly complex and very functional. Moreover, the mind could not have evolved to be a general-purpose learning device that would function as a tabula rasa upon which culture can be arbitrarily inscribed. In terms of the computational power that it would take to do all the numerous things that humans do, to solve the numerous adaptive problems that humans have to solve to function, a general-purpose learning device simply could not perform. In order to perform the way that the mind demonstrably performs it must be composed of a set of psychological mechanisms that solve particular adaptive problems. These psychological mechanisms are themselves highly complex aspects of our brains that must have been individually selected for. I think that much of the behavior that we are talking about in terms of women shaping themselves toward an ideal is the result of psychological mechanisms designed for mate attraction. What could be more central to reproductive fitness then mate attraction?

Matthew: Thank you both for that introduction to your theoretical commitments. Let’s get down to the specifics of the practices that we’re talking about here. Professor Bartky, why don’t you start off by responding to Professor Buss’ statement?

Bartky: Well, that doesn’t really make sense to me David; it seems to me that the practices that we are looking at are not universal but culturally and temporally specific. As I said above, there really does seem to be a difference between the way that bodies are being shaped by power in the past two hundred years or so and the way that they were shaped five hundred or a thousand years ago, much less in pre-historical societies fifty or a hundred thousand years ago. If an explanation based on evolved propensities for behavior really has the explanatory power that you say that it does then where is this shift coming from and why does it fit so well with the particularities of the way that women’s bodily practices are shaped by this feminine ideal? Also, not only the way that women’s bodied are disciplined to conform to the ideal but the ideal itself has changed. Previously in western culture massiveness and abundance was valued in women’s bodies, large breasts and round hips defined the feminine. Today the fashion in women’s bodies is small, lithe, small-breasted, taut, and narrow hipped. There seems to have been a shift toward an almost pubescent and infantilized ideal of femininity away from a more adult, mature, and realistic ideal. In general, styles of the female figure seem to vary across time and cultures; they reflect cultural obsessions and preoccupations in a way that we do not fully understand. But on one level these obsessions and preoccupations seem inherently arbitrary and not subject to an overarching logic, they are historically and contextually specific.

Buss: Well, I don’t know that there has been as much variability as you’re suggesting Sandra. Many aspects of such complex cultural practices might have changed, the details of traditions and images and symbols across cultures are certainly highly variable. But nevertheless I think it’s pretty clear that there are certain basic foundational aspects of behavior associated with mate attraction that are not particularly variable, but are rather transcultural and very ancient, not limited to a particular culture or period. In particular, emulating youth has remained a constant practice throughout history and across cultures and is clearly linked to male selection of fitness for bearing children and raising them to independence. In an ancient hunter-gatherer environment where extreme hazards are common, protection from the environment is minimal, and medical care is essentially non-existent life spans were very short by modern standards and accidental mortality was very high. Moreover, girls become fertile at a very early age relative to our current cultural norms of adolescence and late childhood and certainly became pregnant at an early age in the environment where such an early pubescence evolved. In this kind of environment a young person is hugely more likely to be able to survive not only bearing a child but also living long enough to ensure it survives to an age where it can pass on its genes. That fact would create a powerful selective force for men to try to impregnate younger women as their genetic material would thus have a much higher chance of being passed on. These are powerful reasons for believing that men have an innate drive toward women who are younger. And thus women, who are also shaped by the likelihood of their genes being passed on, would be shaped by the need to solve the adaptive problem created by men’s preference for younger women. A woman who appears to be younger would have a higher chance of attracting a mate and thus passing on their genes. Despite the variability in the details of feminine ideals across cultures and periods there does seem to be an overarching emphasis on youth that fits in very well with this perspective.

Matthew: Perhaps it would be helpful if we moved this discussion toward an analysis of specific examples? It would be helpful if you could give an example of what exactly you mean by a bodily practice Professor Bartky.

Bartky: Well, one example of the depths to which this discipline has penetrated women’s bodies and bodily practices is the advice of M.J. Saffron, an “international beauty expert,” on facial exercises that are meant to eliminate wrinkles, erase frown lines, smooth the forehead, raise hollow cheeks, banish crow’s feet, and tighten the muscles under the skin. Thus the normal and expressive contours of a woman’s face subvert the disciplinary project of bodily perfection and come under disciplinary control. This really shows what Foucault is talking about when he describes the penetration of bodies by disciplinary practices, the way that bodies are petitioned and divided and the way that women live in and experience their bodies.

Buss: But isn’t this yet another example of attempting to shape your features to appear more young and thus more effectively attract males that have been genetically driven to be attracted to youth? What could be more specifically related to youth then lines associated with a lifetime of facial expressions? This is not the result of a historically specific disciplinary practice but part of an evolved strategy to appear youthful. Are not all cosmetics geared toward the concealment of signs of aging? And are not cosmetics an ancient practice that many cultures share? And while these facial exercises might not be effective, the general strategy of appearing more youthful than one really is does in fact seem to be effective in attracting a sexual partner, which is certainly a goal of women going through these practices.

Matthew: Perhaps we could take a moment to shift the discussion a bit. Professor Bartky, your notion that women and men’s bodies have been shaped and penetrated differently struck me as central. Could we talk about that?

Bartky: Certainly. While Foucault laid out a general pattern for understanding the modernization of power and the embodiments that the disciplinary practices of power create he treated the body as though it were one. He spoke of humanity as a whole, as if the place that women and men occupied within structures of power were equivalent and as if women and men had an equivalent relationship to social institutions characteristic of modern life, and in particular as if women and men’s bodily experiences were the same. Certainly women as well as men are subject to many of the same disciplinary practices. But this focus renders Foucault blind to those disciplines that produce embodiments that are peculiarly feminine. While both women and men’s bodies have been rendered docile by disciplinary practices it seems obvious from a feminist perspective that women’s bodies have been rendered docile in a way that far exceeds the docility of men’s bodies. From a feminist perspective this silence about women’s bodies perpetuates the powerlessness and subjugation of women that these disciplinary practices have imposed. I argue that it is precisely the disciplinary practices that Foucault is talking about that produce gendered bodies in the first place. People are born male or female but they are not born masculine or feminine. Uniquely feminine characteristics come from disciplinary practices that produce bodies that are recognizably either feminine or masculine. The disciplinary practices by which women’s bodies are shaped according to an ideal are only one way in which this femininity is constructed. Femininity is also designed and enforced in terms of the very movements that a feminine body is rendered capable of and the construction of the feminine body as a surface for ornamentation and objectification. For example, women are far more likely than men to be concerned with their looks and in particular with fat. In a survey taken at UCLA 27.3% of women said that they were “terrified” of getting fat compared with only 5.8% of men.

Buss: While I agree that there are obvious differences in the way that women and men experience their bodies and the way that cultures think about men and women’s bodies I also think that many of these differences can be explained in evolutionary terms. From an evolutionary perspective it is not at all surprising that women and men would have developed different strategies of behavior. This is because women and men, having different roles in reproduction, face very different adaptive problems in passing on their genes effectively. The primary difference is of course that a woman necessarily invests far more of her time and energy into the development of a child then a man does as a result of the fact that a woman has to carry a child in her body. Because of this commitment of energy, and indeed a large disadvantage in terms of individual survival that would be in itself a significant selective disadvantage, it is vital to a woman’s genetic interests that the single child that she is able to bear live long enough to pass on her genetic material. A woman thus faces two distinct adaptive problems; the first one is that a woman must attract a mate in the first place to be able to pass on her genetic material at all, the second one is that a woman has to find a mate who, also being invested in the survival of his genetic material, would contribute to caring for the baby and thus increasing the chances that her genetic material will survive to reproduce. Unlike women, a man does not have to invest a large amount of time and energy into the production of a baby in order to pass on his genetic material. With millions of sperm produced with every ejaculation a man is able to attempt to maximize his chances of passing on his genetic material by impregnating multiple females with no time delay in between. Though this selective force is balanced by the fact that once the child is born it is also in the male’s genetic best interests that it survives. These very different adaptive problems would necessarily result in the evolution of very different adaptive solutions in terms of drives. A great deal of evidence has been gathered that ancestral women desired high-status in men, high-status being an indicator of a man’s ability to ensure her child’s survival. Conversely, a great deal of evidence has been gathered that ancestral men desired youth in women, young women being far more likely to survive childbirth and live long enough to raise a child to reproductive maturity. Beyond that, the evolution of these different drives in each sex further alters the adaptive environment. Each sex would then have to adapt to deal with the adaptive problems imposed by the drives of the other sex in order to acquire a mate. It is because of this that women and men have such different strategies and concerns in making themselves more attractive to a potential mate.

Host: Thank you for that discussion of the specific aspects of mate attraction that you’re talking about. I would like to shift the discussion now to a consideration of the general nature of each other’s arguments. What do you think that the problems with each other’s assumptions are?

Buss: Well, the real issue that I have with the post-structuralist line of argument is an assumption of causality that doesn’t really seem to consider other factors like evolved psychological mechanisms. Why is it that you can look at a pattern of behavior and assume that it is because of a cultural construction?

Bartky: Well, I think that causality is pretty obvious as we can see the coercive power of these institutionalized ideals. We can trace the way that women are surrounded by messages about what femininity is in the media. We can see that women are bombarded by these messages constantly through the media. And more than that we can see that women pay attention to these messages, they consume this media tirelessly. Not only that but they criticize and judge one another and themselves constantly according to these impossible standards of beauty. Is that not coercive? How could that level of coercive power not cause changes and shape patterns of behavior?

Buss: But what then is the origin of these institutionalized ideals? Where do they come from? What causes them? It seems to me that something like a “power structure,” or a “myth,” or an “ideal” cannot have causative force; only individuals who wield power can actually cause something. And in understanding what individuals do the structure of their mind cannot be ignored. Ultimately it is minds that create the complexities of social structures and variability, and minds are evolved physical objects that have characteristics that have been shaped by the evolution that created them.

Bartky: I think that you’re misinterpreting what I mean by a power structure causing something. Of course ultimately it is people that take action, but that is the nature of structures of power. Structures of power are composed of people; they are systems of people interacting with one another. But as a system they have properties that are not reducible to the properties of the individuals of which they are composed. They are composed of relationships of power between people, and the vast and complex system that is created through all of those relationships can be described and talked about and shapes the people that are set within it. When people act, or “wield power” as you say, they do so within that system. The system does not “cause” a woman to go to a jazzercise class or tape up her forehead to prevent excessive expression in a simple sense, rather the system circumscribes the space within which women can move, limits the range of the actions that can be performed, or even conceived.

Matthew: Well, unfortunately that’s all the time we have left for today. But I would ask, are these views really incompatible? Does one have to deny the significance of structures of power and cultural constructions of femininity in shaping our bodies and minds to appreciate how our bodies add to the complexity of the phenomena through drives and instincts shaped by evolution? Is a totalizing explanation for such a complicated phenomena reaching across many different disciplinary focuses really necessary or even desirable? In particular given how little we know about the nature of, as Professor Bartky says, cultural “obsessions and preoccupations” and how little we really understand about neurobiology and the specific structure of the human mind can we really begin to talk about causality in more than suggestive terms? Personally, I think that both of these perspectives are working toward a sophisticated and appropriately complex understanding of an important part of our world. Thank you Professor Bartky and Professor Buss, and thank you to our audience for joining us. Have a good night.
posted by:
automatthew
New York
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  • Bartky' analysis seems hopelessly muddled and driven entirely by ideology to me.
    • for sure, but the assumptions behind that muddle have really dominated the social sciences in the last few decades. it's really unfortunate, we have these thousands and thousands of very smart people interested in and studying humanity that are just wandering around in an epistemological muddle, unable to agree on a common set of assumptions to try to create a body of incremental knowledge, and unable to interact with the knowledge being created on other levels of analysis more amenable to the methodologies of the physical sciences. to me it seems that we're all interested in the same thing, and that none of us are insane or stupid, we're all perceiving things that are in the world and that are interesting and worth trying to understand. there has to be a conversation about what exactly we are all talking about and how it might fit together. and one that doesn't devolve into the bitterness and polemics of something like the admittedly brilliantly funny sokal hoax.
      • "for sure, but the assumptions behind that muddle have really dominated the social sciences in the last few decades."

        Could you give us an idea (a list of some sort maybe?) of the most important assumptions you think dominate in the social sciences and need to be examined? I seriously had no idea that there was this kind of divide!
        I've always found Women's Studies to by heavy on ideology and light on...well, anything else, really--but I assumed the rest of the social science pack was forging ahead! (I don't want that to sound dismissive or contemptuous--my exposure to Women's Studies has not been extensive and is not terribly current--most of it is actually about a decade old and could be biased by the fact that it was all funneled through the particular faculty at my own university).

        Referring specifically to Bartky above, I don't think she actually understands the argument Buss is making or virtually any of the evolutionary theory that sinews it--particularly her apparent belief that cultural variation is incompatible with a genetic component acting in a subtle way at the level of proclivities rather than specifics.
        Also, her statement that "People are born male or female but they are not born masculine or feminine."
        is very much compatible with the general view in biology, but the next, " Uniquely feminine characteristics come from disciplinary practices that produce bodies that are recognizably either feminine or masculine." makes no sense in that context. What could possible be uniquely feminine characteristics in the context of the previous sentence? And having completely lost any sense of what the hell she could possibly be talking about, the next sentence, "The disciplinary practices by which women’s bodies are shaped according to an ideal are only one way in which this femininity is constructed. " is so nebulous I can't even evaluate or properly critique it. Women's and men's bodies are inherently different in ways that go far beyond the mere plumbing, and those differences are completely independent of social forces. Is she actually denying this? I can't tell--she seems to be! Cultural forces can certainly seize upon these inherent differences and lead to standards of beauty that enhance or accentuate them, but this seems to be what Buss is saying and what is being denied by Bartky.
        • well, the big one is obviously that the mind is a blank slate on which culture is arbitrarily inscribed, and of course steven pinker has talked about that a lot as well as tooby and cosmides with their "standard social science model" discussion in the adapted mind. the thing about this assumption, i think, is that because it is unexamined by many social scientists it becomes very subtle and sometimes difficult to tease out of their thinking. for many of them the evolved nature of the mind is simply not relevant, what they are interested in is culture and the vagaries and complications that happen with culture, and what they see is people acting within that medium, a medium that to them is of obvious importance. i think that the assumption is rather more of an agnostic one than an active position for many, because social scientists are largely concerned with structures of meaning and ideas they're very very comfortable with possibilites and uncertainties, and ones that can't be expressed in terms of probability, so it's easy for them to set aside a perspective focused on the nature of the mind as "one perspective" or "one focus" on the phenomena that they're interested in. human behavior and cognition is so big on the level of culture and meaning that it's very very easy to just set things aside, there are so many things to talk about that it's so easy to say, yeah that might be important but i don't really know anything about it so i'm just going to talk about this one aspect that i have gathered information about. the blank slate assumption also has other forms, partial forms, but i think that it's the basic one. a weaker but related form would be just the assumption that what is most salient to a given human behavior is the cultural context that it takes place in. also the idea that while biology and evolution might be important that they're somehow seperate and that there is a boundary between the two aspects of human existence that is not possible or even desirable to cross. the idea that "translation" between the two perspectives is not possible or desirable. there's also the even stronger position that since any representation of reality necessarily takes place through language, that all we can ever really talk about is language. and that whenever we're trying to talk about the world all we're really talking about is representations of the world, and that the subjectivity of the people making those representations is necessarily the overriding fact in trying to understand them.

          as for social science forging on and whether there really is such a large divide, social science certainly is forging on. and perhaps i notice these assumptions more because i've been trained mostly in anthropology which is particularly steeped in this set of intellectual goals. but i definitely think that while there are certainly many researchers that are interested in understanding the world for itself rather than understanding "the world as words" it's still a far reaching and subtly present conversation that dogs much of the thinking about culture and meaning.

          i'm also interested in studying sexuality which has been very dominated by gender studies mostly done by feminist scholars that are certainly preoccupied with ideology. or at least with a political agenda rather than a pure knowledge agenda. which i think has taken the place of a pure knowledge impetus toward research that has been destabilized by an postmodern epistemological and unresolvable crisis about what knowledge is and how it can be created. destabilization and questioning has become the goal for many very influential thinkers. thinking about knowledge not to help create more knowledge but to try to change the way that we think about the knowledge that we already have.

          and yeah, for sure bartky doesn't understand what buss is talking about. most people who have been totally into the philosophical critical theory brand of social inquiry don't know the first thing about evolutionary logic. although, i do think that they are often talking about aspects of our social world that are real, it's just that their indifference to and ignorance about the way that evolution works and what it can tell is leads them to a sort of cavalier language about bodies. like her reference to "uniquely feminine characteristics", that's a rather more extreme statement then what i think she's really talking about calls for. basically she's preoccupied with the idea that while a distinction between gender and sex is a useful stab at what's going on, that it's more complicated then that, and that there are aspects of the way that women shape their bodies, move in their bodies, and feel in their bodies that are experienced by others as "feminine" that go beyond what one might think of as "gender" in terms of wearing dresses and having long hair etc. i'm totally with you that this is a vague muddle, but i am also sympathetic to their incessant attention to the complexity that i think is pretty obviously there.

          and yeah, i think she is saying that the differences beyond plumbing are about social forces, or like i said if not denying then being stubbornly agnostic on the issue, and insisting that what is salient is the social patterns that she's trying to describe.


          "Could you give us an idea (a list of some sort maybe?) of the most important assumptions you think dominate in the social sciences and need to be examined? I seriously had no idea that there was this kind of divide!
          I've always found Women's Studies to by heavy on ideology and light on...well, anything else, really--but I assumed the rest of the social science pack was forging ahead! (I don't want that to sound dismissive or contemptuous--my exposure to Women's Studies has not been extensive and is not terribly current--most of it is actually about a decade old and could be biased by the fact that it was all funneled through the particular faculty at my own university).

          Referring specifically to Bartky above, I don't think she actually understands the argument Buss is making or virtually any of the evolutionary theory that sinews it--particularly her apparent belief that cultural variation is incompatible with a genetic component acting in a subtle way at the level of proclivities rather than specifics.
          Also, her statement that "People are born male or female but they are not born masculine or feminine."
          is very much compatible with the general view in biology, but the next, " Uniquely feminine characteristics come from disciplinary practices that produce bodies that are recognizably either feminine or masculine." makes no sense in that context. What could possible be uniquely feminine characteristics in the context of the previous sentence? And having completely lost any sense of what the hell she could possibly be talking about, the next sentence, "The disciplinary practices by which women’s bodies are shaped according to an ideal are only one way in which this femininity is constructed. " is so nebulous I can't even evaluate or properly critique it. Women's and men's bodies are inherently different in ways that go far beyond the mere plumbing, and those differences are completely independent of social forces. Is she actually denying this? I can't tell--she seems to be! Cultural forces can certainly seize upon these inherent differences and lead to standards of beauty that enhance or accentuate them, but this seems to be what Buss is saying and what is being denied by Bartky."
          • "well, the big one is obviously that the mind is a blank slate on which culture is arbitrarily inscribed, and of course steven pinker has talked about that a lot as well as tooby and cosmides with their "standard social science model" discussion in the adapted mind. the thing about this assumption, i think, is that because it is unexamined by many social scientists it becomes very subtle and sometimes difficult to tease out of their thinking. for many of them the evolved nature of the mind is simply not relevant, what they are interested in is culture and the vagaries and complications that happen with culture, and what they see is people acting within that medium, a medium that to them is of obvious importance."

            Wow. I seriously had no idea *anyone* was championing--or even accepting for the sake or argument--that sort of view. At least in it's extreme form. To ignore commonalities when looking at cross cultural variation is not unreasonable--as long as you keep in mind that the brain is an evolved structure coadapted with all the other features of the human animal and should be expected to impose limits on behaviour at evolutionary time scales. To ignore--or worse, deny!-- the influence of adaptation on behaviour flies in the face of biology. That doesn't seem like a good way to get at the answers.

            "the idea that "translation" between the two perspectives is not possible or desirable."

            This is the impression I have gotten from several of the feminist authors--that the question of the possible role of evolution in gender differences is itself illegitimate and sexist. I find it bizarre and not a little appalling.

            "like her reference to "uniquely feminine characteristics", that's a rather more extreme statement then what i think she's really talking about calls for. basically she's preoccupied with the idea that while a distinction between gender and sex is a useful stab at what's going on, that it's more complicated then that, and that there are aspects of the way that women shape their bodies, move in their bodies, and feel in their bodies that are experienced by others as "feminine" that go beyond what one might think of as "gender" in terms of wearing dresses and having long hair etc. i'm totally with you that this is a vague muddle, but i am also sympathetic to their incessant attention to the complexity that i think is pretty obviously there."

            I agree with you about the complexity. I just think that the feminist insistence that these issues are uniquely feminine is untenable and largely comes from a place of ideology and political agenda rather than clear thinking. The division of humanity into 'us' and 'them' is part of the human condition overall and needs to be understood that way. The isolation, power struggles and pathologies experienced are not uniquely feminine, even if they are sometimes expressed differently in intersex conflict than they are in inter-class, inter-race, inter-national, inter-faith, etc. contexts.
            The pattern of manifestation swould seem to be largely cultural, but there is a strong argument to be made that the underlying impulse is rooted in biology.
            • "Wow. I seriously had no idea *anyone* was championing--or even accepting for the sake or argument--that sort of view"

              what we saw in the 80s and 90s even was a focus by academics on the role of discourse in culture, and since they made a living off reading and writing, many of them got carried away and saw discourse as the predominant mover of identity. foucault, whom bartky virtually parrots in the discussion, was quite sophisticated and did keep in mind material dimensions to power. but he rightly pointed out that people make up stories to get others to do what they want, and that this is so entrenched that we can lose sight of the effects of a discourse on our behavior. it is smart, while keeping an evolutionary perspective, to keep in mind that people are indeed managed by language and representations quite a lot. this is the central point of poststructural cultural criticism, and it's not wrong; it is incomplete and needs a better framing that is more natural.


              "This is the impression I have gotten from several of the feminist authors--that the question of the possible role of evolution in gender differences is itself illegitimate and sexist"

              just like any field, there are a variety of perspectives, some more robust than others.


              "I just think that the feminist insistence that these issues are uniquely feminine is untenable "

              "third wave feminism" is defined in part by this insight. you're not alone here lenny; many feminists agree with you, and a feminist is usually not ONLY feminist; it's just one label among many that pop in and out of usefulness in varying discussions, focusing on various issues. anti-racism, class awareness, anti-ableism, etc. what people call awareness of "the unity of oppression" has grown in progressive movements. you like to call it "humanism," which is fine.


              "The pattern of manifestation swould seem to be largely cultural, but there is a strong argument to be made that the underlying impulse is rooted in biology. "

              it seems to me that much of the xenophobia we see and paranoia and fear out of proportion to reality might be a result of a stone age ape living in a modern world. i think much of the isms and schisms are based in natural fears and mating tug-of-war, but feel that it's worth the effort to keep pushing ourselves toward a more just and gentle world.
            • well, i think that if you pressed them a lot of them would not be particularly willing to defend that view at length. like i said, i think that the assumption becomes subtly unexamined and unarticulated when it becomes subsumed into a huge literature that is not particularly interested in it. it's not that they're saying "the way the mind has evolved to function has no bearing on human behavior in general" as much as they're saying that for the kind of behavior they're interested in evolution is irrelevant, and yes that insisting on focusing on the biological basis for behavior is somehow an extension of a perceived tendency to "naturalize" sexist and racist assumptions as a way to support them. and of course sexist and racist assumptions HAVE been naturalized in the past, so it's a complicated and difficult issue. the problem i think is that many people who are interested in behavior in terms of culture and behaviors embedded in systems of meaning simply ignore the issue.

              but yeah, i think that in their minds they're not necessarily denying the fact that the brain evolved, they're just making unexamined and unsupported assumptions about the nature of the brain, that it is in fact a general purpose learning device, that that's what consciousness is, that that's what has evolved. and that biologically shaped behaviors are really "instincts" that the advent of consciousness has made irrelevant.

              and of course, that's not true of everyone. plenty of social scientists are not that interested in "deconstructing" arguments or "destabilizing" ideas and are focused on understanding the world. but the intellectual focus on words is still very influential and shapes and limits the kinds of questions empirically oriented researchers are able to ask. and even those people who think that a "fact" is still something that can be coherently described can still tend to limit themselves to the observable. in some ways it's similar to behaviorism in psychology i think.




              "Wow. I seriously had no idea *anyone* was championing--or even accepting for the sake or argument--that sort of view. At least in it's extreme form. To ignore commonalities when looking at cross cultural variation is not unreasonable--as long as you keep in mind that the brain is an evolved structure coadapted with all the other features of the human animal and should be expected to impose limits on behaviour at evolutionary time scales. To ignore--or worse, deny!-- the influence of adaptation on behaviour flies in the face of biology. That doesn't seem like a good way to get at the answers. "
    • women's studies has changed a lot over the past 20 years. it is more of a shift of focus than purely ideological anymore; that is, you can find feminist philosophy of science, feminist approaches to biology, feminist linguistics, etc., and in most cases you'll find rigorous work done to reasonable standards, only with the interests of women and men who support a change in power or more visible gender flexibility taking center-stage.

      as clearly as bartky's analysis is "missing the point" of buss's, i feel the same is true in the other direction. first, bartky hardly acknowledges the pain and suffering caused by beauty standards. yes, standards evolve, yes, mating systems evolve, and YES it sure as fuck can be a bummer for many people. it seems likely to me that we are living with hold-over gender roles from the EEA that are largely irrelevant now, due to contraception, formula, and the greatly lessened need for a sexual division of labor. it is precisely in reaction to this mismatch that feminism should arise -- at least MY brand of feminism, which is wholly evolutionary.

      also, i find that evolutionary psychologists often naturalize functions of the limbic system and endocrinological system while hardly mentioning the functions of the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex and other areas involved in conscious decision-making. you need not have a position on free will one way or the other to recognize that this is a scientific error. what appears to the case is that much of the time for many people, the ACC and DL frontal lobe et al is overloaded with signals from the limbic and midbrain and pituitary gland, and this accounts for the less flexible response mechanisms more clearly adaptive for other situations. i can't account for the range, but there are also a set of people who rationally examine such signals to a greater degree and have more flexible responses. this may be because they have different hormones or limbic system signals going on; it may because they have greater general intelligence; it may be an environmental exposure of some kind.

      my feeling is that feminism, at its best, is the movement for flexibility in our gender and sex roles. we look at the modern milieu and say, what really matters in a mate in this situation? what do i care about individually, on an organismic level? my prescription is to keep the hormones and limbic signals in the loop as much as possible, because the architecture of the brain insures that going against them too much causes stress and pain. but a policy of minimal interference is perhaps best. i want to build trust with women because it feels good and is better than strife, and i want to be flexible in my behavior in a way that people's expectations don't stop me because of my sex. is that too much to ask? and isn't that natural?

      power struggles are natural. and so feminism is a natural extension of the changing modes of production and women being pissed off about people applying old rules. sure, a "barely legal" 18-year old woman might get me aroused, but would i mate with one? no fucking way. i wouldn't even have sex with one at this point. and yes, i probably would in the pleistocene. so?
      • "women's studies has changed a lot over the past 20 years. it is more of a shift of focus than purely ideological anymore; that is, you can find feminist philosophy of science, feminist approaches to biology, feminist linguistics, etc., and in most cases you'll find rigorous work done to reasonable standards, only with the interests of women and men who support a change in power or more visible gender flexibility taking center-stage."

        I don't want to hijack this thread into a debate on Women's Studies, but I have absolutely no idea what "feminist philosophy of science, feminist approaches to biology, feminist linguistics" actually means.
        • "I have absolutely no idea what "feminist philosophy of science, feminist approaches to biology, feminist linguistics" actually means."

          that's a fine question and perfectly relevant to the thread. i'll tell you my take. first, due to a our old sexual division of labor that was more determined by reproductive roles, men have been the ones mostly doing politics and intellectual pursuits, and some of their biases and interests have affected the results. so feminist approaches to various fields attempt to unearth these kinds of biases and rectify them with more neutral approaches (when a feminist method is performed well) or to advance female interests (when it's more of a revenge tactic or overcompensation maneuver).

          a good example of feminist philosophy of science is bonnie spanier's "im/partial science: gender ideology in molecular biology." bonnie has a PhD from harvard in molecular biology, so she's not just bringing a discursive analysis to the table. there are a lot of places in science where we can color things with our biases, and it's good to root them out. feminism these days is a large umbrella under which this kind of work occurs, but it often now includes looking at other dimensions of identity, like race and class.

          just as some day "evolutionary psychology" will be a redundant term, so "feminist philosophy" will be as well. feminism should be just a form of humanism that centers around gender and sex, but not to the detriment of other aspects of our lives, and not to the detriment of solid science or inquiry.

          the question for evolutionists is: how to distinguish a concept like oppression from the expected power struggles between the sexes that we can predict from mating system models? i am guessing lenny, and please let me know, that this is the source of your reticence around the concept of feminism. that really, males and females are making moves and countermoves all the time in mating systems, and any shift too far will have its counterbalancing dynamics, so whence the concept of oppression and feminism? before continuing, does the reflect you at all well? it seems consonant with your comments about female forms of violence and your discomfort comparing power between women and men.
          • "a good example of feminist philosophy of science is bonnie spanier's "im/partial science: gender ideology in molecular biology.""

            I haven't read it and I'm not likely to--I was not at all impressed by her own synopsis of it. What arguments do you think she made that were worthwhile and why on earth do you (or she) insist on classifying them as feminist? Identifying and correcting sources of bias (of all kinds) in science isn't a *feminist* philosophy of science.

            "feminism these days is a large umbrella under which this kind of work occurs, but it often now includes looking at other dimensions of identity, like race and class."

            Then why on earth would you call it feminism rather than humanism?
            • "I haven't read it and I'm not likely to--I was not at all impressed by her own synopsis of it."

              can you be more specific?


              "Identifying and correcting sources of bias (of all kinds) in science isn't a *feminist* philosophy of science"

              i have no problem with this point, except just to notice that some people are more affected by varying biases more than others, and therefore show more interest in exposing biases along certain lines. if you are a progressive pale-skinned brother such as ourselves, we are more likely to see oppressions as interrelated and on equal footing, because no one oppression or bias affects us. but this is a bias about biases. also, some people will show more competency at revealing a particular species of bias.


              "Then why on earth would you call it feminism rather than humanism? "

              it's really pretty loose. humanism is fine; feminism is just humanism focused on gender and sex issues. i consider these distinctions to be semantic and trivial to a degree, and those who don't -- e.g. feminists who insist that sexual oppression is primary over others -- as being over-focused. sure, if bias based on sex affects your life more than bias based on race, then i see no reason why you can't focus on talking about your experience, but you should also see how you participate in biases along other lines. women's studies departments exist to rectify first and foremost biases based on sex, but since people don't just come in sexes, they deal with other identity vectors as well. african american studies departments may focus on race, but they have to deal with sex and other aspects of identity as well, or they fail, in my book.

              really if you are a person of any shape or color or genital formation who combats overgeneralizations and unfairness of any kind, than we're all on the "same team."

              obviously i am against any bias about biases that is not simply a focus borne of one's personal experience. as a white north american male with some material access and in a straight relationship, most oppressions are not tangible in my everyday life in the same way they are for others, other than being a weirdo and not liking to be tied down by typical expectations for my body-type anymore than the next cat. but am i oppressed as such? we stretch the word to meaninglessness if we include me, i'd say. the systematic structure of my experience is not such that any group other than one i am presumed to belong is systematically blocking access or marginalizing my experience, except maybe for corporations and ultra rich people, who are the decision-makers of culture.
              • "can you be more specific?"

                Sure. I'm referring to her article on sexism and scientific research, here:
                findarticles.com/p/article...72055/pg_1
                Which contains a great deal that is at best caricature--at worst outright strawman, as well as a great deal that seems like pure nonsense.

                Here are some examples:
                "Gender-associated bias in the field of molecular biology is more subtle but equally profound and damaging. Molecular biology has come to be defined primarily as molecular genetics, equating life with the gene by singling out but one of many important, interacting components to be placed at the top of a hierarchy of control: DNA is crowned the controlling molecule of life."

                Um...huh? This is a gross mischaracterization (people can and do work primarily with genetics believing genetics is the end all and be all or "equating life with the gene"), and I think it's absurd to attribute such a comic book view to "gender-associated bias" even were it held.

                Later, she adds "At the microscopic and submicroscopic levels of cell organization, we find distortions similar to those of the whole organism and its social relations: superimposing gender stereotypes onto nongendered entities (egg and sperm cells, cytoplasm and nucleus, female and male hormones); creating hierarchies of control and organization within the cell to favor male-associated components (nucleus, genes, DNA);creating mutually exclusive categories that mirror a dualistic ideology of male and female (such as genetic versus nongenetic causes or defining a gene as strictly the DNA sequence); and claiming that biology ultimately determines behavior (genes or the sequence of bases in DNA will tell us what we need to know to make us healthy and prosperous, making the Human Genome Project a high priority for increasingly scarce research funds).
                Calling hormones "male" and "female" is inaccurate and misleading, because both types are found in both male and female humans and because hormones affect many things other than the development of secondary sexual characteristics. A belief in centralized control and unequal power relations remains the overriding metaphor in molecular-biology textbooks and scientific literature. The predominant meaning of "difference" in such texts carries values and ideologies of "power over" and "better than," and the choice of DNA as the controller carries overtones of hereditary as well as "unchanging." With a hierarchy of power and control reinforced at yet another level of our world-view, all ideologies of "difference" are further cemented into a "natural" superiorinferior relationship."

                I think this is absolute fucking nonsense, and I find it virtually impossible to take it seriously. Please tell me you don't want me to pull it apart sentence by painful sentence.

                "A question we keep hearing repeated - and answered each time with a new explanation that is then debunked - is, in what ways are men and women biologically different, and how does that relate to behavioral difference? By casting the question in terms of a search for biological and behavioral differences between two groups -- rather than, for example, a quest for understanding the range of variation and similarities across populations and cultures - we have set the terms of investigation and analysis. Null findings (no statistically significant difference) are not of interest and so tend to go unreported and unpublished. Biological differences are correlated with behavioral differences, despite the fallacy of equating correlation with cause. The findings that humans exhibit greater variation in biology and behavior between individuals within groups such as "women," "men," "blacks," "whites," "heterosexuals," and "homosexuals" than the average differences between groups are ignored to emphasize group differences, whether sex differences, racial-heritage differences, or others."

                There are so many things wrong with this paragraph I hardly know where to start. The consensus is that race as the term is commonly understood is a social construct rather than a biologically real and evolutionarily relevant distinction. I should think that the same could be said of sexual orientation--something probably best modeled as a continuum and broken into categories largely as social convention. 'Male' and 'female', on the other hand, are biologically real and evolutionarily significant categories. Their relevance in evolutionary theory is well founded in theory and in many species well supported experimentally. And the fact that we don't expect a genetic component to dominate human behaviour in no way makes the study in this area illegitimate or inherently sexist
                • lenny, there are good points peppered in with muddle puddles here, as i suspect you know. for example, the manner in which some biology books characterize sperm and eggs as stereotypically behaving in a masculine and feminine way is really silly (cf emily martin's work). also, sexing hormones as female or male IS bad science, and glosses over important facts about development and differentiation. nature doesn't speak in black and white terms, and development constraints are serious when organisms differentiate along sexual lines. feminists want everyone to think about the gradients and diversity of sexual identity, and this is GOOD SCIENCE and true. i also think many of them have too often glossed over differences, so they get my stink eye as well.
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.
                    "for example, the manner in which some biology books characterize sperm and eggs as stereotypically behaving in a masculine and feminine way is really silly (cf emily martin's work)."

                    I have no idea what that means. And I have no idea what textbooks you are talking about. The different strategies that are optimal for males and females ultimately flow from the differences in gametes--you should expect there to be a relationship. I don't think it is the scientists that are reading a lot of negative nonsense into that relationship, and I don't think it is the job of scientists to bend over backwards to accommodate feminist oversensitivity

                    "also, sexing hormones as female or male IS bad science,"

                    Again, I have no idea what that means or who exactly is supposed to be doing it.
                    • martin, spanier, fausto-sterling et al provide examples from various textbooks. Why would you assume textbooks don't fuck up? Martin gives examples of a med school text that presents eggs as completely passive damsels and sperm as heroic explorers. Its just silly stuff that crops up. I don't get your incredulity here lenny, this is not generally a field that is anti-scientific.

                      Sexing hormones and glossing over the continuous nature of many sexed characteristics occurs in a lot of places. A good example where a hidden agenda against diversity in sex is in the work of john money, who was for a time considered the expert on intersexuals. other examples aren't too hard to find.

                      Also, as for your expectation of varying natures and conflicts of interests between sexes, I agree. A naturalist feminism would take such things into account and be honest. But it may amount to our deciding that some natural tendencies aren't serving anyone's interests anymore, or result in poor public policy or socioeconomic practices that we want to avoid.
                      • "martin, spanier, fausto-sterling et al provide examples from various textbooks. Why would you assume textbooks don't fuck up? Martin gives examples of a med school text that presents eggs as completely passive damsels and sperm as heroic explorers. Its just silly stuff that crops up. I don't get your incredulity here lenny, this is not generally a field that is anti-scientific."

                        I'm not assuming textbooks don't fuck up, but I can't find that sort of fuck up in any of mine, including the ones I have laying around from 25 years ago when I was an undergraduate. And if it's not a problem in the primary research (it's not) and it's not even a problem in most textbooks (and you might try looking at reproductive physiology and endocrinology textbooks rather than medschool texts if you want to see the actual science), then why should I--as a scientist--give a rat's ass? How is this relevant to the Philosophy of Science? If there is a systematic sexist bias in the *science* then pony up some evidence--if there isn't then this is a non-issue as far as science is concerned--and probably should be as far as Philosophy of Science is concerned.

                        "Sexing hormones and glossing over the continuous nature of many sexed characteristics occurs in a lot of places. A good example where a hidden agenda against diversity in sex is in the work of john money, who was for a time considered the expert on intersexuals. other examples aren't too hard to find."

                        I still have no idea what "sexing hormones" means. It's not something that I see in my endocrinology or physiology texts--it's not something that I am aware of in the primary literature. If the whole problem basically boils down to med students and psychologists/sexologists aren't required to be up to speed and accurate on the actual science, then the problem is pedagogical, not scientific.

                        "But it may amount to our deciding that some natural tendencies aren't serving anyone's interests anymore, or result in poor public policy or socioeconomic practices that we want to avoid."

                        Hey, I agree with you--but as a human being and a citizen--it has nothing to do with philosophy of science per se as far as I can see. And it certainly doesn't mean that investigating these questions should be discouraged--something that many feminists seem to be pushing for.
                        • "I'm not assuming textbooks don't fuck up"

                          well, many of the critiques are valid; obviously they are policing different expressions of science than you have at hand. sounds like you personally shouldn't care, though you are dismissing a rather large field and range of critics with a wave of your hand and a few back flaps and cursory glances under your belt. emily martin's "the woman in the in body" is dated now, but is a fine piece of work in my memory, as is fausto-sterling's "myths of gender" and "sexing the body."

                          www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/an...y/martin.html
                          bms.brown.edu/faculty/f/afs/afs.html

                          maybe you should actually be familiar with some of the critiques in question before being so certain they have no points to make?

                          a central problem -- and we've seen this with dawkins and others -- usually goes down when science becomes popularized. you might not give a shit about pop science, but you'd be remiss to note its influence on people's opinions. i feel you should be glad that some good work is being done ferreting out poorly chosen rhetoric in any form. it's also where the intersection of science and policy takes place where some of the poor rhetoric has a serious affect. (for example, forcing surgery on intersexed kids as a matter of fact.)

                          also, i don't think i've been clear that feminism should mean being concerned about roles and over-rigid definitions of male behavior as well. we're so used to considering feminism as utterly female-centered and advocating female interests, that one of its primary components -- anti-sexism -- is forgotten. you're getting a taste of my brand of feminism, but there are obviously many, some of them more ideological and reactionary than others.


                          "I still have no idea what "sexing hormones" means."

                          considering androgens male, and estrogens female.

                          i think this problem not only occurs in popularizations, but in our notions of the "correct" balances of hormones in a body. we predicate our notion of hormone levels based on normative cultural ideals sometimes in medicine. examples include pathologizing PMS as a disease.


                          "Hey, I agree with you--but as a human being and a citizen--it has nothing to do with philosophy of science per se as far as I can se"

                          it does when the scientific rhetoric conflates political agenda. that's the whole point.


                          "And it certainly doesn't mean that investigating these questions should be discouraged--something that many feminists seem to be pushing for. "

                          agreed. though i can't bring to mind any feminists who are saying we shouldn't do any research. usually a feminist phil of science would just ask us about the presumptions and premises of the research questions and methods, to see if the deck is already loaded. which is a good idea, in my book.

                          • "maybe you should actually be familiar with some of the critiques in question before being so certain they have no points to make?"

                            That's sort of why I was asking you to give me the boiled down version! What concerns me most is not the irrelevancy to me personally but the awfulness that has its origin in their own minds rather than in the wider world. I'm talking about stuff like Spanier's quote "...creating hierarchies of control and organization within the cell to favor male-associated components (nucleus, genes, DNA)" I think the notion that these are "male-associated components" is bizarre ideology-driven crackpottery.

                            "a central problem -- and we've seen this with dawkins and others -- usually goes down when science becomes popularized. you might not give a shit about pop science, but you'd be remiss to note its influence on people's opinions."

                            It's not that I don't give a shit about it so much as it is that I don't think it has anything to do with philosophy of science or the actual science. These are problems with the media--with popular press, journalism (especially journalism!), television...but not the science.

                            "also, i don't think i've been clear that feminism should mean being concerned about roles and over-rigid definitions of male behavior as well. we're so used to considering feminism as utterly female-centered and advocating female interests, that one of its primary components -- anti-sexism -- is forgotten. you're getting a taste of my brand of feminism, but there are obviously many, some of them more ideological and reactionary than others. "

                            I appreciate that. You may actually be the *only* feminist I've personally encountered who feels that way. My personal interactions with our local feminists have been overwhelmingly negative, and I have no doubt that affects my willingness to put time into reading feminist philosophy. It has left a very bad taste in my mouth, and quotes like the Spanier quote above seem to be from the same hymnbook.

                            "considering androgens male, and estrogens female.
                            i think this problem not only occurs in popularizations, but in our notions of the "correct" balances of hormones in a body. we predicate our notion of hormone levels based on normative cultural ideals sometimes in medicine. examples include pathologizing PMS as a disease."

                            PMS is pathologized because of the behavioural effects. Hormone levels are part of the etiology, not the diagnosis. If something is having a negative impact then it's pathological, isn't it? I'm not sure what you are claiming here--are you saying it doesn't exist? Or that it isn't pathological?

                            "it does when the scientific rhetoric conflates political agenda. that's the whole point."

                            Scientific rhetoric seems like an oxymoron to me.
                            • ruth hubbard and evelyn fox keller are other examples of feminist philosopher's of science you might find interesting. of course there is always the steven rose and richard lewontin contingent as well. the infamour mary midgley's feminism is more considered and reasonable than most for sure. truthfully, not one of them gets it all right. but should we be surprised? in what field does someone get it all right? it's just not that common.


                              "I'm talking about stuff like Spanier's quote "...creating hierarchies of control and organization within the cell to favor male-associated components (nucleus, genes, DNA)" I think the notion that these are "male-associated components" is bizarre ideology-driven crackpottery. "

                              i'll ask her why she thinks these are masculinized. i don't recall her support material for this notion. knowing her, she does have examples of when this is done. i doubt she's presuming they are masculine to begin with!!! that would be A+ hypocrisy. she is almost certainly gesturing at other sources that aren't evident in the quote.


                              "You may actually be the *only* feminist I've personally encountered who feels that way. My personal interactions with our local feminists have been overwhelmingly negative"

                              it's likely they are more affected personally in a particular way, like being sexually abused, or ignored or underappreciated, based on their sex, and so that spirits their outlook in ways that are sometimes accurate, but other times clouded by their hurt. one could say, hey, feminists are just wounded women turning their pain into ideology, but then the sheer number of women in pain would throw a master aikido move on that argument and you'd find yourself facing the systematic mistreatment of women that is the premise of feminism!!


                              "Or that it isn't pathological?"

                              PMS is a drag, and treating it to feel better is fine. but it is NOT a disease. actually, the emotional hypersensitivity that often accompanies it can be a good flush of emotions built up and can highlight things that need highlighting.


                              "Scientific rhetoric seems like an oxymoron to me. "

                              well, you get the affect of discourse and aren't attached to models regularly the way that most people are. i don't think your wisdom is as common as you might imagine though.
                            • ""...creating hierarchies of control and organization within the cell to favor male-associated components (nucleus, genes, DNA)""

                              okay, i've checked out her book for more background on this, and her angle is that viewing molecular activities hierarchically and in terms of "control" isn't always appropriate, and this kind of error is more prone among men than women.

                              from my exhaustive and exhausting work on free will and determinism, i have to agree, albeit with caveats. the notion of control is certainly an odd one for a determinist. it seems to be a matter of perspective, and a matter of what kind of question one is asking. do segments of DNA control a cell? well, what of magnesium, or some other element that DNA requires? are they in control? and then, well, what down-the-line source of magnesium could be said to be in control? at some point we lose sight of the item of analysis (the cell) and find ourselves in foreign territory when we see the bigger picture.

                              but hers is not simply an argument of recursion, like mine, but rather an argument about metaphor and language. could metaphors like dancing or team-building or symphonies or whatever be as appropriate or even more appropriate than hierarchy when describing some molecular processes?

                              the quote you grabbed is poorly worded, especially the "male-associated" piece that bugged you. it seems to me that sexing the problem is itself an example of the very skew she is deriding, albeit perhaps statistically valid (i.e. more males see things in terms of hierarchy than females do).
                              • "okay, i've checked out her book for more background on this, and her angle is that viewing molecular activities hierarchically and in terms of "control" isn't always appropriate, and this kind of error is more prone among men than women."

                                Where and how did she get the data on proportions of men and women in these purported different camps?

                                "it seems to be a matter of perspective, and a matter of what kind of question one is asking. do segments of DNA control a cell? well, what of magnesium, or some other element that DNA requires? are they in control? and then, well, what down-the-line source of magnesium could be said to be in control? at some point we lose sight of the item of analysis (the cell) and find ourselves in foreign territory when we see the bigger picture."

                                This just doesn't seem like a big problem to me. There are methodologies for working out what functional units are given a specific context. I don't think the effects of a specific gene deletion aren't typically hard to distinguish from the effects of a mineral deficiency or whatever.

                                "could metaphors like dancing or team-building or symphonies or whatever be as appropriate or even more appropriate than hierarchy when describing some molecular processes?"

                                I think the metaphor that gets trotted out most frequently nowadays is cooking (DNA is the recipe, environment is the ingredients, oven temperature, humidity of the kitchen, etc., ontogeny is the act of cooking, phenotype is the cooked dish that pops out of the oven sort of thing)

                                "the quote you grabbed is poorly worded, especially the "male-associated" piece that bugged you."

                                Yes! That is exactly what got my goat.

                                "it seems to me that sexing the problem is itself an example of the very skew she is deriding, albeit perhaps statistically valid (i.e. more males see things in terms of hierarchy than females do)"

                                Do they? Are you sure it's not a class thing? Or an American thing? Or a capitalist thing? Or a western thing? Or a Judeo/Christian thing? Or an age thing?
                                • "This just doesn't seem like a big problem to me. There are methodologies for working out what functional units are given a specific context"

                                  then you are agreeing with at least the most forgiving interpretation of spanier's point, minus the "male-centered" qualifier. that is, the notion of "control" molecularly is problematic and very dependent on what questions we are asking. am i off here?


                                  "I think the metaphor that gets trotted out most frequently nowadays is cooking"

                                  i like this one. and it does get the way genes work in concert better than other metaphors.



                                  "Do they? Are you sure it's not a class thing? Or an American thing? Or a capitalist thing? Or a western thing? Or a Judeo/Christian thing? Or an age thing?"

                                  i would propose that within each division you present, males are more explicitly interested in hierarchy and ranking than women. we compete with each other in different ways than women might. isn't that tenable, lenny, that males are more into explicit hierarchy than females generally speaking? i thought this was a rather supported characterization for humans and chimps. we can't acknowledge sex differences only when it works for our benefit to do so!

                                  that being said, i like to point out to women who sense feminine superiority that there kindness and non-violence (at least physical) is probably highly dependent on a sexual division of labor wherein men faced higher risk of personal harm and also were required to mete out harm without losing their cool. in other words, women couldn't be so nice if men weren't taking the heat. sure, there are other variables involved, but the point remains valid to a vital degree.


                                  • "then you are agreeing with at least the most forgiving interpretation of spanier's point, minus the "male-centered" qualifier. that is, the notion of "control" molecularly is problematic and very dependent on what questions we are asking. am i off here?"

                                    I guess. Is someone actually disagreeing with this? Other than the way complexities get stripped out of explanations when they get dumbed down for a non-biologist readership?

                                    "i like this one. and it does get the way genes work in concert better than other metaphors."

                                    I'm not sure who came up with it, but it's a keeper. And it can be boiled down to the pithy and catchy "DNA is like a recipe, not a blueprint"ay, easy to understand, easy to remember, and carries a lot of useful information.

                                    "i would propose that within each division you present, males are more explicitly interested in hierarchy and ranking than women. we compete with each other in different ways than women might. isn't that tenable, lenny, that males are more into explicit hierarchy than females generally speaking? i thought this was a rather supported characterization for humans and chimps. we can't acknowledge sex differences only when it works for our benefit to do so!"

                                    I don't think that's true. Women are just as interested in hierarchy, they just have a different way of going about it. People suck, and women suck just as much as men. You want to see the hell that is female hierarchy? Ask women about their relationships with their mothers and especially their mothers-in-law. Ask them about the hell that was high school, or what their work place is like now. Women are awful to each other, they just don't typically use their fists to deliver the beating.
                                    • "I guess. Is someone actually disagreeing with this? Other than the way complexities get stripped out of explanations when they get dumbed down for a non-biologist readership?"

                                      i think so, but i'm not as famiiliar with the root scientific literature as you are. for example, DNA is portrayed as a kind of centralized controller fairly often, no? i think in order to really flesh this out, we'd need to clearly denote what "control" means molecularly and biologically, and see when it's reasonable to speak in such terms. it's seems an obviously proximate concept that is highly analysis-dependent, but not without meaning. for example, one could speak of the degree of effect a change would bring about in a structure as a measure of its "control." for example, changing the mineral content of an animal's meal vs. changing some sequences? well, obviously the segments of DNA have more effect. does that translate into a notion of centralized control? ah, i find myself uninterested in the very notion really. i'd rather talk about causal chains and dependencies than "control" myself.

                                      you got me reading spanier's book more thoroughly, and i have to say it is largely good scholarship. i'm not saying this because she's a friend, though my opinion is informed by my personal opinion of her, but because it's good work. better than the quotes you pulled, more careful so far.


                                      "Women are just as interested in hierarchy, they just have a different way of going about it."

                                      what does this different way of going about it amount to? i think that's the question.
                                      • "i think so, but i'm not as famiiliar with the root scientific literature as you are. for example, DNA is portrayed as a kind of centralized controller fairly often, no?"

                                        Depends what you mean, I guess. You can't get away from a certain amount of hierarchical language when you are dealing with a causal chain or cascade because the cause is ontologically 'superior' to the effect, and even though DNA is affected itself by various forms of feedback it's a point of immense leverage in the process that makes it appropriate to give it a special place.

                                        "what does this different way of going about it amount to? i think that's the question. "

                                        Um....why? If your contention is just that they aren't interested in hierarchy, why would the particular techniques they use to exert control matter?
                                        • "the cause is ontologically 'superior' to the effect, and even though DNA is affected itself by various forms of feedback it's a point of immense leverage in the process that makes it appropriate to give it a special place"

                                          only when asking specific questions or looking at specific relatioships, not in and of itself! that's at least MY point about this. and certainly being a necessary antecedent to something doesn't make it "superior." superior is a value-statement not a temporal and causal one. you are making the oopsie that she's concerned about here, i feel.
                • "'Male' and 'female', on the other hand, are biologically real and evolutionarily significant categories."

                  i already posted a fair assessment of this earlier in this thread, i think (maybe in the sexual orientation thread). first, since males and females are the same kind of organism with various spurts of hormones applied to the same tissue development, the notion of a continuum applies. sexed traits exist along a continuum clearly, and intersexuals are the clearest markers of such a gradient. sit still lenny, i'm no idiot, i get that it's not the same as we see with race.

                  i suggest the reason sex is not as continuous as other traits like those associated with race is clear: sex predominantly evolved as a means of not only keeping enough genetic diversity in play to combat ever-evolving parasites, but as a way of protecting infection via a two-transmission of organelles during fertilization. in other words, one kind of being carries the baby, and receives only the nuclear DNA of the other kind of being. as we know from looking at hermaphroditic species, the risk of infection is much much higher. well, that's a serious difference! and it's where the line is drawn in the sand, as i think you would agree. bingo. this is the manner in which you are correct.

                  now, the question really is, *when* is such a line relevant? and how might such relevancy be affected by human-specific conditions and abilities? these are the questions that tend to give rise to "feminist" values. is one's reproductive capacity relevant in, say, a notion of one's general intelligence? one's ability to be a leader? etc.

                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.
                    "sexed traits exist along a continuum clearly, and intersexuals are the clearest markers of such a gradient. sit still lenny, i'm no idiot, i get that it's not the same as we see with race"

                    A gradient huh? Where does the Y chromosome fit into this gradient? When it comes to the Y, I don't see a gradient but a binary.
                    • I'm not sure I should bother replying Jonathan, since I've already been clear. First x and y are signifiers that are a shorthand for varying sex chromosomes to a degree, and a bunch of people have different combos. Also, some females are XY and males XX in other species. Second look at the quote you pulled from me!!! I was stating clearly how the line is drawn. Also sexed TRAITS like hair growth, voice, boob size, clit and penis size, etc do exist on a continuum. Intersexuality makes this clear. Study sex differentiation and you see the same tissues devloping differently in the presence of testosterone: a continuum at a certain level. When it comes to gametes, the line is drawn. You are either a male or female. But sex encompasses more than this in our lives. We are sexed in ways other than the kind of gametes we have.
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.
                    "i already posted a fair assessment of this earlier in this thread, i think (maybe in the sexual orientation thread). first, since males and females are the same kind of organism with various spurts of hormones applied to the same tissue development, the notion of a continuum applies."

                    There is no continuum between eggs and sperm! Different strategies are appropriate depending on which of those you are producing. And there is a very clear potential for conflict of interests between individuals using the different strategies.

                    "now, the question really is, *when* is such a line relevant? and how might such relevancy be affected by human-specific conditions and abilities? these are the questions that tend to give rise to "feminist" values."

                    Science should be concerned only with correctly testing the predictions and correctly interpreting results in regard to the hypothesis from which they were derived. It should be free of ideologies and social/political agendas--including feminist ones.
        • "I don't want to hijack this thread into a debate on Women's Studies, but I have absolutely no idea what "feminist philosophy of science, feminist approaches to biology, feminist linguistics" actually means."

          Sandra Harding would probably be the the most prominent exemplar of the feminist critique of science. She is notorious for calling Newtonian mechanics a "rape manual".
          • the actual quote:

            "One phenomenon feminist historians have focused on is the rape and torture metaphors in the writings of Sir Francis Bacon and others (e.g. Machiavelli) enthusiastic about the new scientific method. Traditional historians and philosophers have said that these metaphors are irrelevant to the real meanings and referents of scientific concepts held by those who used them and by the public for whom they wrote. But when it comes to regarding nature as a machine, they have quite a different analysis: here, we are told, the metaphor provides the interpretations of Newton's mathematical laws: it directs inquirers to fruitful ways to apply his theory and suggests the appropriate methods of inquiry and the kind of metaphyiscs the new theory supports. But if we are to believe that mechanistic metaphors were a fundamental component of the explanations the new science provided, why should we believe that the gender metaphors were not? A consistent analysis would lead to the conclusion that understanding nature as a woman indifferent to or even welcoming rape was equally fundamental to the interpretations of these new conceptions of nature and inquiry. Presumably these metaphors, too, had fruitful pragmatic, methodological, and metaphysical consequences for science. In that case, why is it not as illuminating and honest to refer to Newton's laws as "Newton's rape manual" as it is to call them "Newton's mechanics"?"

            she's questioning the usage of rape and torture metaphors in science, as well as "nature as female" and "male as dissociated observer" narratives.
            • an interesting link:

              plato.stanford.edu/entries/...temology/

              i studied feminist philosophy of science with both ruth ginzberg and bonnie spanier and others at length and got a lot out of my studies. it's a good skill to have, to be able to weed out personal agendas and spins from sources that claim objectivity. it's basically what my training was in for many years in many ways, now that i think about it... i'm a bit of a professional bullshit detector i guess! not to say i am not guilty sometimes too...
            • harding is a bit muddled here, so don't think i am just clapping my hands at her statement. as an aside though... newton was a complete and utter asshole religious nut who wrote more about religion than science, made bitter enemies most of his life, and acted as warden of the mint, presiding over the torture and killing of counterfeiters with monotonous regularity. he was a royal genius prick.
            • i think that this question is pretty easily answerable. mechanistic metaphors are important because they help to highlight important aspects of the system being described. gender metaphors are not important because as feminists have pointed out, they emanate from hegemonic sexist ideas about nature not from a genuine insight into the way that nature works.


              "But if we are to believe that mechanistic metaphors were a fundamental component of the explanations the new science provided, why should we believe that the gender metaphors were not? "
              • "i think that this question is pretty easily answerable. mechanistic metaphors are important because they help to highlight important aspects of the system being described. gender metaphors are not important because as feminists have pointed out, they emanate from hegemonic sexist ideas about nature not from a genuine insight into the way that nature works. "

                Indeed. Thinking about nature as a machine seems to **work**; it helps scientists discover new processes, invent new technologies, etc. This is called the "proof is in the pudding". Has any scientist ever discovered any useful laws / technologies /etc through thinking of nature through a feminist prism? Anyone? Ever? I sincerely doubt it. When it comes to a feminist analysis of science, where's the pudding?
                • "Has any scientist ever discovered any useful laws / technologies /etc through thinking of nature through a feminist prism? Anyone? Ever? I sincerely doubt it. When it comes to a feminist analysis of science, where's the pudding?"

                  dude, the point of feminist analysis of science is to NOT use gender metaphors. you are flipped around here.
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.
                    Where is the gender metaphor? Since when is an aeroplane or computer (both technologies) gender-biased? I don't think even the Sandra Hardings of the world would say that technology is gender biased. Or perhaps they do? In that case there's not much point in even discussing the issue, since we are into complete loony-tunes territory.
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.
                    "dude, the point of feminist analysis of science is to NOT use gender metaphors. you are flipped around here."

                    My point is still valid. Since when has NOT using gender metaphors (whatever that implies) produced pudding? If no pudding has been produced, this is a demonstration par excellence that the attempt to avoid using gender metaphors is counter-productive. I suppose Harding could argue that producing pudding is itself a male-oriented activity and a gender-neutral science would be more akin to sitting around a knitting circle talking about daisies. She might even be correct. But I'd say that this is a profoundly anti-feminist attitude, since it leads immediately to views such as Lawrence Summers'.
              • "mechanistic metaphors are important because they help to highlight important aspects of the system being described."

                you seriously underestimate the trouble caused by machine metaphors, and the confusion they have caused in biology and psychology specifically.

                in biology, the notion is a central aspect of adaptationist errors and hyperteleological thinking. i see people slip in and out of teleological thinking based on mechanistic notions of living organisms all the time. it's simple: machines were built by an intending designer, lifeforms were not. sure we can loosely call structures that arise from selection as "designed," but i think it actually gets us more into trouble than out.

                brain as hydraulic system, brain as computer... sure, metaphors are useful, but people routinely confuse the utility of metaphors all the time. our computer-based metaphors are so routine and feel so natural we barely recognize them as metaphors, because we are in the time of computers. people used to feel the same way about pressures in the body when hydraulics were invented.
                • "you seriously underestimate the trouble caused by machine metaphors, and the confusion they have caused in biology and psychology specifically. "

                  The problem is not the use of metaphor per-se, but the use of improper metaphors.

                  What's wrong with teleological thinking? Is the function of a baterial flagellum not propulsion? Where's the error in that? The error is to assume that teleology implies design, not the use of teleology per se.

                  "people used to feel the same way about pressures in the body when hydraulics were invented. "

                  And thinking of the heart as a pump is still perfectly valid.
                • well right, but the thing is that with the mechanistic metaphor you can talk about where the metaphor is useful, like in talking about traits functioning to do something that gives the organism a selective advantage, and where it stops being useful, like when it suggests a designer. i don't think that feminists criticisms of science are capable of being that clear about what it is that they're saying gender metaphors actually do in our understanding of the world.

                  though actually, something rather ironic just occured to me. the postmodern assumption that the brain and body are passive recepticles of ordering and organizing culture could be thought of as an extension of this nature as passive/female/unconscious and culture/technology/science as being active/male/conscious and in that sense is a great example of the misuse of the gender metaphor.

                  though i think the main problem with their criticism is that neither of these things really begins to undermine the basic foundations of scientific thinking, science is more than capable of dealing with both of them.



                  "you seriously underestimate the trouble caused by machine metaphors, and the confusion they have caused in biology and psychology specifically. "
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.
                    "i don't think that feminists criticisms of science are capable of being that clear about what it is that they're saying gender metaphors actually do in our understanding of the world. "

                    i personally don't think you know what the fuck you're talking about, pardon my french. since you're comfortable making such broad statements, why don't you share with us some references to feminist criticisms of science that you're familiar with?
                    • the impression i'm getting from you fellows is that feminist critiques of gender bias in science have no validity. am i wrong? because that is an absurd position to take, and transparently reactionary. if you tried a moment to relax your defenses and consider the general possibility of gendered bias in science, you'd easily find examples of it, surely. perhaps i haven't read you right, because you are responding specifically to harding and spanier's small excerpts (not works, mind you).

                      as lenny said, this is really more about bad science than sexism qua sexism, and there are other biases and subjective leaks in science all the time. does that amount to there being no point to feminist philosophy of science? come on. and harding and spanier aren't the only ones in the world, so disproving dimensions of their arguments doth not a refutation of feminist critiques make. i bet you all have personally experienced such biases in your own life actually! also, sexism cuts all ways, not just women, so biases for females over males are crappy, too, of course.
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.
                    "though i think the main problem with their criticism is that neither of these things really begins to undermine the basic foundations of scientific thinking"

                    so, which feminist philosopher has said that their criticism undermines the basic foundations of science? this is a straw woman, matthew. at their best, they.... well, we... are trying to *protect good science* from leakages of personal rhetoric and biases.
                    • "so, which feminist philosopher has said that their criticism undermines the basic foundations of science? this is a straw woman, matthew. at their best, they.... well, we... are trying to *protect good science* from leakages of personal rhetoric and biases."

                      I'd point to the arguments of Nelson, who would like our epistemology to incorporate feminist values. It's a Quinean argument from underdetermination, and essentially, rather than the standard scientific practice of applying Occam (picking the simplest explanation and discarding more complex explanations), she would like us to pick explanations that are most in accord with feminist values. I'd classify that as an attack on the foundations of science, since it is a direct attempt to bring subjectivity into the foundations of science (values are inherently subjective). She would probably argue that Occam itself is not value-neutral, that a fondness for simplicity is simply a male value and unjustifiable on a natural basis. I would disagree. Once you throw out Occam, you are throwing out the core of the scientific method.
                    • hehe, well you're certainly getting spirited blue-j.

                      i certainly think that there is a point in analyzing bias in science. and i think that the feminist focus on gender bias is fine, whatever motivates scholars to look into something like that is fine.

                      but i don't think it is a straw women. you yourself limit your statement to those theorists that are "at their best". plenty of people in critical theory are far more interested in destabilizing scientific epistemology than protecting good science. as for specifics, how about luce irigaray? and while judith butler does not explicitly theorize about science that i've read, her theoretical position is certainly that nothing can be talked about except for systems of signification, and any attempt to appeal to a pre-signified reality is invalid.


                      "so, which feminist philosopher has said that their criticism undermines the basic foundations of science? this is a straw woman, matthew. at their best, they.... well, we... are trying to *protect good science* from leakages of personal rhetoric and biases."
                      • but anyways, like i said in the paper i don't think that critical theory and science are incompatible at all. but i do "privilege" the ontological primacy of the universe over our own systems of signification. and i think that that assumption should be central to thinking about a productive way that science and critical theory can communicate with one another productively. and from my own endless exposure to the intellectual project of post-modern critical theory in my undergrad education in anthropology and my current ma in human sexuality studies, tons of critical theorists do not share that position. mostly they seem to be agnostics about it, interested in other things. keep in mind that critical theory assumes that eradicating bias is not a possible or even desirable objective, rather they emphasize positionality, identifying biases in others and trying to be explicit about the bias in ones own work. so when a critical theorists identify bias in science, their expectation is not that that bias can then be dealt with through a better research design, particularly when they talk about a pervasive systematic bias that they are usually referencing when talking about science.
                        • " i do "privilege" the ontological primacy of the universe over our own systems of signification"

                          sure, but when we start to describe or model something, we introduce another player, and that's important to keep in mind. also, not to get nit-picky, but experience is always mediated by a detection system(s) that has built into it a set of valuations. no one gets to experience the reality unperceived or mediated by perception. you can't run with this point as far as some hyperconstructivists run with it though, because our detection mechanisms are part of the very world they are detecting, so we do have some serious notions of objective reality. and the scientific method does give us some tools to reconcile subjectivities -- to a point. but privileging ontic primacy before mediation? not fully possible. before signification? sure, but in choosing how to describe something, we begin to invoke what matters to us as the center of focus, as well as semantic associations, etc.
                        • "i do "privilege" the ontological primacy of the universe over our own systems of signification"

                          and now from spanier's book:

                          "i start from a premise that there are things 'out there' that we humans can perceive and have detected, measured, manipulated, and transformed by direct interaction or through instruments that extend human perceptions.... For me, the social construction of knowledge does not mean that society invents ideas that have no relation to physical entities and processes.... Also, I do not accept what seems to me to be an inherently classist view that language is all, or that representation supersedes materiality." p11-12
                          • well good for her. i actually haven't read spanier. just fausto-sterling and irigaray.



                            "and now from spanier's book:

                            "i start from a premise that there are things 'out there' that we humans can perceive and have detected, measured, manipulated, and transformed by direct interaction or through instruments that extend human perceptions.... For me, the social construction of knowledge does not mean that society invents ideas that have no relation to physical entities and processes.... Also, I do not accept what seems to me to be an inherently classist view that language is all, or that representation supersedes materiality." p11-12"
                            • irigaray is floating in space, but what's so wrong with fausto-sterling? what have you found in her work that bothers you?
                              • well, you've already said that you think sex is usefully thought of as a continuum, at least developmentally, but i don't really buy it. i mean clearly there is a continuum of potential errors in the way that genetically coded development can happen, but i don't really think that it's a problem (or "problematic" in pomospeak) to highlight the fact that human beings are sexually dimorphic and that 98.3% (to use fausto-sterlings own over-general definition of intersexuality) of the population fall into well defined developmental categories. i've read sexing the body and i find it preachy and disjointed. her fundamental goal is not to improve science but to advance a radical gender politics, and while she might not be as spacy as irigaray i don't really think that the priorities she's putting forward make too much sense. she jumps all over the place to make her point and it doesn't really come together for me. science understands very well that androgens don't just affect men and estrogens don't just affect women and that "sex hormones" are actually just growth hormones. and while i'm sympathetic to her call for a more rational approach to intersex babies that really an emotional appeal and doesn't really have much to do with the basic point that the gender binary is real. i just don't respect her thinking in general too much, to support her general criticism of the assumption that genes determine the way that the developing body will interact with it's environment and what the results will be, she cites the following example on page 239 in a section titled "socializing the cell"...

                                "just after the turn of the twentieth century in the Bengal Province of India, the Reverend J. A. Singh "rescued" two children... girls succored since infancy by a pack of wolves. The two girls could run faster on all four limbs than other humans could on two. They were profoundly nocturnal, craved raw meat and carrion, and could communicate so well with growling dogs at feeding time that the dogs allowed the girls to eat from the same bowls. Clearly these children's bodies - from their skeletal structure to their nervous systems - had been profoundly changed by growing up with nonhuman animals"

                                would you care to defend that assessment? it seems like utter nonsense to me. putting aside the absurdity of putting air quotes around the word rescue in the first sentence, it's biomechanically absurd to suggest that a human being could change their bodily structure just by growing up with wolves so that it actually worked better for them to be on all fours. and how on earth did they know what the girls craved? if they hadn't eaten anything else they would want what was familiar to them. and how idiotic is it to suggest that it's because of the girls "communication" that they other wolves tolerated them? and thats if you even accept the report from a century ago! and she puts this forward as evidence!


                                "irigaray is floating in space, but what's so wrong with fausto-sterling? what have you found in her work that bothers you?"
                                • "well, you've already said that you think sex is usefully thought of as a continuum, at least developmentally, but i don't really buy it."

                                  thanks for being upfront.


                                  "i mean clearly there is a continuum of potential errors in the way that genetically coded development can happen,"

                                  is it an error if it results in no disability? do you evaluate error only in terms of reproductive fitness? you also are rather egregiously sweeping under the rug that secondary sexual characteristics are quite apparently more continuous, comfortably conflating all continuous models with gamete dimorphism. a "woman" with microphallus/macroclitoris or whatever you want to call it with XX but almost no breasts and a lower voice... you're comfortable telling this person they are an "error"? on what grounds? YOUR COMFORT ZONE. these are real people you are referring to, matthew, not statistical data. www.isna.org


                                  "but i don't really think that it's a problem (or "problematic" in pomospeak) to highlight the fact that human beings are sexually dimorphic and that 98.3% (to use fausto-sterlings own over-general definition of intersexuality) of the population fall into well defined developmental categories"

                                  there are a number of characteristics associated with sexual identity, as i said before, and they each have different distributions, and cluster differently as well. all i advocate for is that our language and conception of sex reflect better the range of people, and fausto-sterling asks the same.



                                  "i'm sympathetic to her call for a more rational approach to intersex babies that really an emotional appeal and doesn't really have much to do with the basic point that the gender binary is real"

                                  what comprises a more rational approach to intersexed babies then? explain your alternative rationale.



                                  i've done a lot of work on people who are reportedly raised by other species, have another species as an alter with dissociative identity disorder, and the like. will post more later, gotta sleep...
                                  • substitute "difference" for "error" then. this is a moral question not a scientific one. they're people, but they're very very few people. and i don't see why it makes sense to "sweep under the rug" the fact that the vast vast vast majority of people develop into a well defined sexual physiology because a tiny fraction of the population does not, other than the fundamentally moral question of the injustice of thinking of them as "errors." i don't mean to dismiss the importance of that moral question, but i think that it's possible to treat people with respect without imposing a fundamentally moral imperative on the structure of scientific thinking about human development. continuous variation in 1.3% of the population (and it's not in fact even nearly that high) does not a continuum make.

                                    as for intersex babies, i think that they should left alone and treated with love and respect until they're old enough to make a choice for themselves whether they want surgery or not.


                                    "is it an error if it results in no disability? do you evaluate error only in terms of reproductive fitness? you also are rather egregiously sweeping under the rug that secondary sexual characteristics are quite apparently more continuous, comfortably conflating all continuous models with gamete dimorphism. a "woman" with microphallus/macroclitoris or whatever you want to call it with XX but almost no breasts and a lower voice... you're comfortable telling this person they are an "error"? on what grounds? YOUR COMFORT ZONE. these are real people you are referring to, matthew, not statistical data. www.isna.org "
                                    • and i never said that people were errors, i said that the well understood genetically determined process of development sometimes does not unfold exactly according to that genetically encoded plan. it makes sense to call that deviation an error, and it does not necessarily imply that the person resulting from it is an error. obviously it's profoundly immoral to think of a person as an error. but biological development is not a subjective process, and recognizing that there is a "norm" from which it is possible to deviate is not the same thing as making a value judgement. i fully support condemning any such value judgements, but again, that is a moral and political argument not a scientific one.
                                      • "you're comfortable telling this person they are an "error"? on what grounds? YOUR COMFORT ZONE. these are real people you are referring to, matthew, not statistical data"

                                        Come on blue, that's a dishonest intellectual swticheroo, a straw man of biological essentialism. Sure someone can have errors in their DNA. Does that make the *person* is an "error" (whatever that means)? Of course not. You are close to falling into the loony-tunes fallacy of certain differently-abled advocates who insist that there is "nothing wrong" with blindness/deafness/downs syndrome or any of the other genetic errors they advocate for respect for. It's an unintellectual fallacy based on mistaking the person for the body; because we respect a person doesn't mean we need to believe that whatever genetic affliction they are suffering from is "perfectly ok, nothing to see here, move along", and shouldn't be fixed if we have the technology/ability.

                                        Sure people with congenital deafness are REAL PEOPLE. That doesn't mean there isn't something wrong with being born deaf, that it isn't a genetic error of some sort.
                                        • it would be extra cool if you knew what the hell you were talking about, jonathan. or should i say, "we were talking about"? we're talking about a particular subject not all disabilities or "errors" in general. would you please reread my post less cursorily? i don't want to repeat what i've already written there.
                                    • argue with me and not anne. and please reread my post and try again. you're on a higher horse than i am and not actually listening.
                                      • I was replying to a particular rhetorical point that I thought you were making:

                                        to quote:

                                        "you're comfortable telling this person they ARE an "error"?"

                                        NOT "You are comfortable telling this person that THEY HAVE a genetic error"...

                                        There is a very large rhetorical difference between these two statements above.

                                        Now, it is quite possible that I am making an issue out of a perfectly innocent typo/slip on your part. If you didn't mean to argue what I thought you were arguing (ie. the meaning of the first statement above), then say so. I've got a particular bee in my bonnet about this subject, so if I came down on you like a ton of bricks, apologies....but still, I was replying to what YOU WROTE, not what Anne wrote.
                                        • i was speaking with matthew, monsieur. really the largest ahem error you guys are making is conflating a bunch of phenomena associated with sexual identity into a pair of boxes. almost ALL of the traits associated with sex exist on a contunuum of development. the genital tubercle reacts to hormones around 6 weeks in, and the hormone bath varies in its composition. what develops into what, what size it is, how hairy it ends up, etc., all are continuous traits. gametes are the most binary, which makes sense, since we are dealing at that point with efficacy of fertilization, and your genes just ain't gonna be passed if you can't reproduce, aside from copies in kin.

                                          also, language vs. reality. language distills diverse phenomena to communicate all the time. let's stop being shocked by that.
                                          • "gametes are the most binary, which makes sense, since we are dealing at that point with efficacy of fertilization, and your gene"

                                            Ok, but when it comes to sexual attraction we are also dealing with efficacy of fertilization (if you are carring sperm then trying to fertilize another guy is pretty inefficient). So by this argument we'd *expect* sexual attraction to be binary rather than continuous (especially in the male). So perhaps conflating into a pair of boxes does make sense when it comes to the two core sexual differentiators (gametes and sexual attraction).
                                            • uncharacteristically poor logic, jonathan, considering our mating system. there are a lot of ways to "get the job done." one way is to jump estrus mostly and charge up critters with massive sex drives with small broods and big parental investment. sound familiar? so, as long as the fertilization gets around to getting done, the other tens of thousands of sexual experiences, straight, gay, group, oral, anal, whatever can still occur. just look at the bonobos for a different mating system that amounts to this strategy. i've read (ridley in red queen) that we are really most like a species of woodpecker in our mating system than any other primate. intriguing thought.

                                              also, sex serves other biological functions than reproduction!
                                            • "Ok, but when it comes to sexual attraction we are also dealing with efficacy of fertilization (if you are carring sperm then trying to fertilize another guy is pretty inefficient). So by this argument we'd *expect* sexual attraction to be binary rather than continuous (especially in the male)"

                                              why "especially in the male"? isn't it just as inefficient to try to match egg to egg? what assumptions are at work here for you?
                                              • "why "especially in the male"? isn't it just as inefficient to try to match egg to egg? what assumptions are at work here for you?"

                                                Asymmetrical.

                                                Female has an egg and it's going to get fertilized even is she spends 75% of her time with other girls (the 25% of her time she spends with the boys will be enough to get the egg fertilized.)

                                                The male is NOT guaranteed to fertilize anything with his load. Even if he spends 100% of his time with girls he may still be S.O.L. If he spends 75% of his loads in boy bums he's almost guaranteed not to reproduce at all.
                                    • i think calling for 5-6 sexes as anne does is more a ploy to get us to think about the relationship to language and reality and to respect people who don't fit neatly into our categories than an actual platform. at least, that's where i stand on this.

                                      that is not the same as saying that sexed characteristics come in twos. that's all i'm saying here (we seem to have lost matthew?) but you are so quick to lump people together it seems, that you didn't stick around to listen more. it's not just a matter of intersex, it is a matter of looking at the fantabulous variety of sexed and gendered structures and behavior and allowing room for all of it in your thinking. that's really all this amounts to, is not mistaking distributions as uniform, or conflating characteristics.
                                      • well, i think that it is possible to make room for understanding such complexity without pretending that the gender binary doesn't exist. the gender binary is one of the strongest and clearest patterns that we can see in that complexity and any understanding of it has to include it and build on it. it seems to me that fausto-sterling is taking her cues from an intellectual movement that values "revolutionary" thinking more than clear thinking and assumes that progress is always best served by shaking things up and throwing things out, with such convulsions motivated by political and moral need rather than new evidence. i don't see how her paradigm describes the reality any better than the current one, and while i think that any paradigm can always be improved i just don't see that motivation in fausto-sterlings admittedly "radical" and "revolutionary" position. i mean, what is stopping us from trying to think about new avenues for research that place the phenomena of intersexuality at the center of the analysis? what exactly about the current model makes that impossible?


                                        "it's not just a matter of intersex, it is a matter of looking at the fantabulous variety of sexed and gendered structures and behavior and allowing room for all of it in your thinking. that's really all this amounts to, is not mistaking distributions as uniform, or conflating characteristics."
                                        • "i think that it is possible to make room for understanding such complexity without pretending that the gender binary doesn't exist"

                                          much more of the time we should speak of trends and patterns and distributions, not "binaries." (jesus, computers are taking over every fucking field in our metaphors...)

                                          yes, most people fall within a range of what we expect that we can meaningfully describe at times as two sexes, but the thing you're showing no sign yet of getting is that the relevance of such a categorization -- which is a distilled semantic convenience -- is not a universal given. words are tools; they should be put down when not in use; and not every tool is right for every job.

                                          also, as i've written again and again with little positive feedback, the continuity of the sexed characteristics depends on which trait you look at. some traits, like height, show clear distributions correlative to sex, but there's tons of overlap, and the range is fairly wide. facial hair? check out the lady in le tigre who keeps her mustache. boobs? well, there are certainly more man boobs than many would like to admit! clitoris size? sensitivity? penis size? scrotal tissue is not surprisingly like labial tissue, wrinkled, because they are made from the same tubercle components! prepuce - clit; foreskin - hood; scrotum - outer labia; prostate - urethral sponge; female ejaculation, males leaning to orgasm without ejaculating, men with nipples, effeminate men, butch women; voices low and high, etc.

                                          each trait has a different distribution, though they do cluster with some predictability around what we call "two sexes." so, fine, let's use that as a shorthand, knowing that the tubercle develops differently related the hormone bath it receives 6-weeks in, which is in fact variable. language always oversimplifies into discrete units of reference; that's one reason we can become so alienated from our experience.

                                          so please, matthew, show me a sign that you get me and aren't just fighting the fight against those nasty feminist ideologues, and maybe i won't think you're an ideologue as well! just because some ideologies are more popular and nearly invisible at times doesn't make them any less ideological.

                                          also, note that i am not anyone's dog (no offense to dogs who might be reading this).
                                          • *shrug* i'm not fighting a fight. i'm just a young student who has been presented with an argument that i don't find convincing. especially since i DO support radical gender politics and the right of anyone to call themselves anything they want, and so don't worry too much about being thought of as an "idealogue."



                                            "so please, matthew, show me a sign that you get me and aren't just fighting the fight against those nasty feminist ideologues, and maybe i won't think you're an ideologue as well! just because some ideologies are more popular and nearly invisible at times doesn't make them any less ideological. "
                                            • and yeah, i "get it," i did read the book.

                                              i just don't agree with fausto-sterlings conclusions, and i'm not sure what yours are or why they're different.

                                              all language is an approximation, the question is what language best describes what we're looking at, and it seems to me that the "clusters" are a more prominent organizing feature of what is to be described than the very rare exceptions. the fact that the current language can describe extremely well all the various ways that a developing fetus would vary from the standard developmental process because of differences in the hormone bath that you have so often referenced speaks to its effectiveness as a model.

                                              it just doesn't make sense, it kind of make sense, but not really. and what pushes it over the edge to make someone passionate enough about it to write a book is politics and morality, and i just don't think they're relevant. they exist and are important independently of this, respecting peoples bodies and gender identities is important no matter what is or is not true about developmental biology.
                                              • "they exist and are important independently of this, respecting peoples bodies and gender identities is important no matter what is or is not true about developmental biology."

                                                the respect is borne of an analysis of the developmental biology, because once you know that women and men aren't "opposites" but rather beings that develop along a continuum of traits related to the amount of androgens they get during a couple critical spurts. sure, it's sensible and practical to refer to two sexes, but a true understanding of the range of people and what accounts for that range is directly connected to the moral and political response to them.

                                                the fact that you barely express compassion and agreement with much of what is being said, conflate everything into a single argument you're not getting -- whether "postmodern critical theory" or the argument for more sexual terms -- seems to be like you are reacting on an ideological basis. i say, don't counter ideology with more ideology, express back how complicated things really are, how some things may be true and others false, and that ideology -- which after all is comprised of thought formulae that reduce complexity -- is blinding in any form, whether it's masculinism or feminism.
                                                • i couldn't possibly disagree more. respect comes out of the fact that they are thinking feeling beings. they should be respected irregardless of anything having to do with this. we understand the range of physiological sex very well indeed, if not gender or the complex ways that culture and biology interact to create experience, and having respect for all people and all bodies and the right of anyone to challenge GENDER roles or modify or think about their body any way they like is perfectly possible alongside that present understanding.


                                                  "the respect is borne of an analysis of the developmental biology, because once you know that women and men aren't "opposites" but rather beings that develop along a continuum of traits related to the amount of androgens they get during a couple critical spurts. sure, it's sensible and practical to refer to two sexes, but a true understanding of the range of people and what accounts for that range is directly connected to the moral and political response to them. "



                                                  what on earth is "masculinism" and why does it have anything to do with me?

                                                  "whether it's masculinism or feminism. "
                                              • matthew, you keep ignoring everything i've said about the continuity of secondary sexual characteristics for some reason.
                                                • ok, here we go.

                                                  number one, "sexed characteristics" is a very broad term that has way more to do with gender than with physiological sex. height, facial hair, etc. are associated with gender not physiological sex. physiological sex is chromosomal sex, internal reproductive organs, and external genitalia. there isn't really any overlap here, except in the case of intersex people, and they develop for very specific and for the most part well understood reasons. while there is a continuum of POTENTIAL development here there is nevertheless a well defined and well understood process by which well defined "male" or "female" internal reproductive organs and external genitalia develop. variations from that process produce intermediate individuals in a tiny tiny percentage of the population, not nearly the 1.7% that fausto-sterling quotes (findarticles.com/p/article...313/pg_2). the current model understands why that happens very well. the RESPONSE to it happening is a different thing. the fact that any deviation from normal physiology and gender norms is so negatively reacted to is a cultural thing. the concept of "normal" might be used to support that response, but ultimately it's arbitrary, and the "real" impetus behind opposing it is that it's wrong to treat any human being that way. no matter what. "normal" is not a word that is relevant to human beings because all conscious things are beautiful and wonderful and "sacred" because of their consciousness, and whatever body they have is whatever body they have. i "get" the fact that you want to attack the negative response by arguing against what they use to justify it (the concept of "normal") but just because it's being used in this awful way doesn't mean that it isn't the most accurate description of the complexity that we've got.

                                                  number two, the fact that the external genitalia develop from a single common set of tissues. so what? that's the process. it's understood. it results in male or female genitalia the vast vast majority of the time.

                                                  men have nipples because the basic pattern of sexual development is female and male development happens when you disrupt that pattern. again, so what?

                                                  men can learn to have an orgasm because they're basically seperate physiological processes that can be disassociated from each other, so what?

                                                  everything else you mention is gender, not sex.




                                                  "also, as i've written again and again with little positive feedback, the continuity of the sexed characteristics depends on which trait you look at. some traits, like height, show clear distributions correlative to sex, but there's tons of overlap, and the range is fairly wide. facial hair? check out the lady in le tigre who keeps her mustache. boobs? well, there are certainly more man boobs than many would like to admit! clitoris size? sensitivity? penis size? scrotal tissue is not surprisingly like labial tissue, wrinkled, because they are made from the same tubercle components! prepuce - clit; foreskin - hood; scrotum - outer labia; prostate - urethral sponge; female ejaculation, males leaning to orgasm without ejaculating, men with nipples, effeminate men, butch women; voices low and high, etc. "


                                                  "matthew, you keep ignoring everything i've said about the continuity of secondary sexual characteristics for some reason."
                                            • "with an argument that i don't find convincing"

                                              there is not a single argument to not find convincing! are you referring to fausto-sterling's "five sexes" specifically? i don't understand what you're lumping together into "an argument" here.
                                              • everything i've said has been specifically in response to things that fausto-sterling says in sexing the body. have you read sexing the body? she starts out the book by repudiating the five sexes thing in favor of saying that sex is a continuum, which she now says was just a rhetorical stunt anyway. in sexing the body she makes several arguments that "a body's sex is too complex... there is no either/or.. rather, there are shades of difference... labeling someone a man or a woman is a social decision.. we may use scientific knowledge to help us make that decision, but only our beliefs about gender, not science, can define our sex.. furthermore, our beliefs about gender affect what kinds of knowledge scientists produce about sex in the first place."

                                                i get that it's complicated, and i get that it's variable, and i get that individual traits are in a sense continuous, and i get that no category is independent from systems of meaning and that how we live in and experience our bodies is produced through the complex interaction of biology and culture.

                                                but science has to create categories to describe phenomena, and sex is such huge phenomena, so obviously central, so clear, across all of biology and so fundamental to evolution, that i think it makes perfect sense to give it a central place in any model of human development. and while there is variability and continuity in the way that individual traits potentially develop, the clusters are very clear, even with some overlap. i mean i just took a course on the basics of this, and yes we all develop from the same gametes, and yes, when there is variation in the hormone bath what intermediate forms may develop come out as a point on a continuum between the two poles, but there is a very clear evolved developmental process, with certain things being triggered and certain things being shut down that develop into an organism that is instantly recognizable as male or female. add that to the obvious function of such a developmental outcome and it seems pretty obvious that this is a phenomena that is "real" and is not "too complicated" or a "social decision." at least not for the vast majority of people, intersex people are of course placed in a position where it absolutely becomes a social decision and the bigotry that's surrounded anyone who differs from gender norms has caused horrible injustices to be perpetrated on their helpless bodies. but it just doesn't make sense to think of sex as a continuum. it isn't one.


                                                "there is not a single argument to not find convincing! are you referring to fausto-sterling's "five sexes" specifically? i don't understand what you're lumping together into "an argument" here."
                                                • "i get that it's complicated, and i get that it's variable, and i get that individual traits are in a sense continuous, and i get that no category is independent from systems of meaning and that how we live in and experience our bodies is produced through the complex interaction of biology and culture.

                                                  but science has to create categories to describe phenomena, and sex is such huge phenomena, so obviously central, so clear, across all of biology and so fundamental to evolution, that i think it makes perfect sense to give it a central place in any model of human development."


                                                  these statements express the most clarity, from my viewpoint. as i've written, language is a tool. if a binary sex model is doing good and effective work, then that is fine with me. but to continue to hold a screwdriver when the situation calls for a hammer is foolish (an example for me IS when discussing intersexuality). in reality, before we describe our bodies, they are nuanced and subtle, with shared and unique features, and traits we associate with sex, both primary and secondary, exist along a range, just like everything else. it's a state of detachment from signification, of understanding that any act of signifying invokes mediation, and every mediation creates a distance. this is not some hokey ass pomo jerk-off shit from an ivory tower casualty trying to get tenure or slip in some ideology that maintains a victimization narrative; this is the reality of language use.

                                                  you also would do well to reflect on the meaning of sex, why it evolved, all the varieties of sexual selection and relations between the sexes. it's good to consider, for example, that among animals we are not very sexually dimorphic. there's also a lot more shared parental investment in our species than in many; very few have more. we mostly have monogamy with cheating, often serial, but sometimes lifelong and often for years at a time. males and females of our species cooperate more than in many.

                                                  consider the developmental constraints on sexual dimorphism as well. men have nipples not because we are all female without the androgens, though that is fair enough, but it begs the question, why? you aren't stating an evolutionary explanation here, but a proximate developmental story. there is an energetic cost -- not to mention having the mutation available! -- to generating difference. there has to be a selective pressure to really make a different developmental sequence occur. there would have to be a selective pressure AGAINST nipples in males, and it would have to be serious, and there would also have to be a mechanism by which males could have no nipples and females could retain them. and so far -- thankfully, because i like my nips -- no dice on that scenario.

                                                  sex evolved to mitigate infection, first and foremost, though there is still debate on this matter. the variety is great for immune systems and rotating in different ways of fighting disease, and with one gamete tripped of all its organelles (sperm) and the other with them (eggs), you mitigate infection at the point of fertilization as well. that's the primary work of sex, as well as the primary reason there are basically two types (one with organelles, one without), and then of course, design and pressures accumulate on top of that over time. sexual selection being one major force at work. in humans, it does not appear that there has been either the means or pressures to divide people in very divergent forms along sex. sure, in all species i know of, females and males start out with the same developmental components and then diverge later in development. but how much? that varies. and what does the difference mean? what DID it mean, and what DOES it mean now? that's where a naturalist feminism that serves all people's interests can find footing.

                                                  nature does not speak in absolute binaries (as an aside i could point out that even computers average voltage states from high to low and have cutoffs to determine whether a signal counts as a "1" or "0"). the complexity of the forces that drives the continued evolution of sex in each species is nifty and fascinating. clam shrimp, harvester ants, look them up. it's all very cool. stick with using the categories as tools, and we have much in common here. you can see i am not fausto-sterling's parrot by now.
                                                  • it never occured to me that you were blue-j, and in fact i nearly always think that you're right on on all the posts that you make, in this tribe and beyond. i've just been stubbornly refusing to stop arguing with fausto-sterling instead of you. and anyways, i've been surrounded by strong cultural constructionists my whole short academic life so far so that's what i'm reacting to emotionally in terms of having a bad attitude and being intellectually ungenerous. i think it's fabulous that you're into both sides of it because that's where i seem to be heading too. i to my chagrin unfortunately cannot bear learning the nuts of and bolts of physical science but on the other hand think that evolution is just about the biggest and most important idea ever and that anyone that thinks you can understand human beings and ignore it is off their rocker. i just got ganged up on in class yesterday for suggesting that understanding the neurobiology of homosexuality was important and should be researched, because it doesn't have a direct activist application. frankly not sure where to go from here, my current program is definitely just going to train me in standard cultural constructionists models of theory building and research design. i want to be more cognitively and evolutionarily oriented but i didn't get a lot of that training as an undergrad and am not sure where to get it now.


                                                    "stick with using the categories as tools, and we have much in common here. you can see i am not fausto-sterling's parrot by now."
                                                    • so happy to hear back from you; i feared some of my stridency alienated you! the truth is, people everywhere have agendas, and even the ones pointing out the power of discourse are often using it to their advantage or to support a worldview which furthers their interest. getting to the truth requires detachment from language and models as well as constantly trying to be honest with oneself. it's not easy at all.

                                                      don't give up on bringing evolutionary biology into cultural studies. more later, got to go! peace, j
                                • "would you care to defend that assessment? it seems like utter nonsense to me. putting aside the absurdity of putting air quotes around the word rescue in the first sentence, it's biomechanically absurd to suggest that a human being could change their bodily structure just by growing up with wolves so that it actually worked better for them to be on all fours"

                                  i've done tons of research on cases where allegedly humans were raised by other species (there are only about 70-100 cases), along with cases where people with DID had alters of other species, as well as schizophrenics with non-human dramas. i can tell you with confidence that it is never ever a good thing, and the "air quotes" in anne's quote is a fucking ideological trainwreck not borne of the actual experience of such kids.

                                  have you see truffault's "wild child"? it is a bit sad to see a feral human become a hypercivilized frenchman. neither extreme is good for the soul!
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.
                    matthew, please forgive me. i'm sorry for my harsh phrasing. i'm excited that you're here and have started this wonderful thread and am embarrassed to have lost my head. i hope you can forgive me and we can move on with this great discussion!
      • i'm totally with you there blue-j. just because something is evolved doesn't mean it isn't part of the domination of women. patriarchy is by all evidence profoundly ancient after all.


        "as clearly as bartky's analysis is "missing the point" of buss's, i feel the same is true in the other direction. first, bartky hardly acknowledges the pain and suffering caused by beauty standards. yes, standards evolve, yes, mating systems evolve, and YES it sure as fuck can be a bummer for many people. it seems likely to me that we are living with hold-over gender roles from the EEA that are largely irrelevant now, due to contraception, formula, and the greatly lessened need for a sexual division of labor. it is precisely in reaction to this mismatch that feminism should arise -- at least MY brand of feminism, which is wholly evolutionary.
  • "Indeed, every animal, including humans, that is alive today is alive because every single one of its ancestors was successful at solving the adaptive problem of passing on their genetic material before they died, and all the host of problems that needed to be solved to get to that point. This series of successes has shaped the human organism to be successful, i.e. to solve adaptive problems."

    buss's methodology can explain a lot of the luggage on the train... but not its usefulness in the town we got off at! we don't need the wool sweater in the desert. and this is basically why he comes off as clueless from a feminist perspective.

    and bartky, lest anyone thinks she escapes critical attention, didn't show a sign of having studied evolution for five minutes, which is fucking outrageous, since how can you study humans without understanding evolution, when that's how we came to be? come on people!

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